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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ATTORNEY SUCCESSFULLY
INVOKES PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN BEHALF OF CLIENT
T HE FEDERAL courts are sharply divided on the question of an
attorney's standing to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in behalf of his client.1 United States v. Judson,2
,which involved an attorney's refusal to produce his client's cancelled
checks and bank statements3 during a tax fraud investigation, pre-
sents a review of this problem. In a split decision, the United States
-Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an attorney may
invoke his client's privilege4 where the client himself could do so
were he in possession of the documents.
I Compare Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum) (attorney
can invoke client's self-incrimination privilege) and Application of House, 144 F. Supp.
95 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (attorney can withhold accountant's workpapers under privilege
against self-incrimination) with Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir.
1963) (attorney cannot withhold accountant's workpapers) and United States v.
Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959)
(attorney cannot withhold accountant's workpapers).
2 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
* Certain other papers, because they were confidential and were prepared during
the attorney-client relationship, were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
However, the checks and bank statements were not confidential documents and
therefore did not satisfy the necessary conditions for protection under the attorney-
client privilege. See 8 WIGNoXE, EVIDENCE § 2308 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
4 The term "privilege," where used without further description, refers to the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In so ruling, the court adopted Wigmore's view that "if the client is compellable
to give up possession, then the attorney is; if the client is not, then the attorney is
not. It is merely a question of possession, and the attorney is in this respect like any
other agent.... It follows, then, that when the client himself would be privileged
from production of the document... the attorney having possession of the document
is not bound to produce." 8 WioREoa:, EVIDENCE § 2307, at 591-92 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) (Italics in original).
The court did not discuss the possibility that the documents were within the
scope of the "required records" exception to the privilege against self-incrimination.
According to this exception, fully discussed in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S.
1 (1948), the privilege may not be used to avoid disclosure of documents which are
required by law to be kept. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
"every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof,
shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply
with such rules and regulations as the Secretary or his delegate may from time to
time prescribe." INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6001. Two federal courts have stated that
on the basis of this provision tax records are within the "required records" exception.
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Willis, 145 F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
universally considered to be "personal."" However, the federal
courts do not agree on the effect to be given this description in
determining whether an attorney may invoke his client's privilege.
One of the earliest and most frequently cited cases in which the
Supreme Court so described the privilege was Hale v. Henkel.7
There the Court refused to allow a corporate officer to invoke the
privilege for the benefit of the corporation," saying that the privilege
against self-incrimination is "personal" and was never intended to
be used for the protection of a third person.9 In Bouschor v.
United States0 an attorney asserted his client's privilege to avoid
production of an accountant's workpapers, which had been delivered
to him by the accountant at his client's request. The court relied
heavily upon the Hale description of the privilege as "personal""
and did not allow the attorney to withhold the papers. The
Bouschor court and the dissenting judge in Judson felt that the
description of the privilege as "personal" bars anyone but the
privilege-holder from invoking it.12 The rationale of the majority
Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955). These cases do not decide whether they would describe
cancelled checks and bank statements as "required records." For a discussion of the
"required records" exception and its significance in tax fraud cases, see Gordon, When
Can Records Be Withheld During Tax Investigations, 17 J. TAXATiON 174, 176 (1962);
Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAx L. REv. 191,
192-95 (1954).
'See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
' 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
8 The officer asserted his own privilege to avoid production of corporate records.
However, the Court refused to allow him to withhold them since an immunity
statute protected him against the use of any of this evidence in a later proceeding.
Then the officer argued that he should be allowed to withhold the records because
the immunity statute did not protect the corporation. The Court found that he
could not invoke the privilege to protect the corporation. Id. at 69-70.
'Ibid.
13 16 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
"I1d. at 458.
12 Before considering the capacity of an attorney to invoke his client's privilege
against self-incrimination, the Bouschor court considered the applicability of the
fourth amendment. In connection with the latter, the court stated: "Of course, a
lawyer may assert a constitutional privilege on behalf of his client in a proceeding
of this kind when the client is a party...." 316 F.2d at 458. In considering the
self-incrimination privilege, the Bouschor court did not refer to this broad proposition.
As a result, the holding of the case is not completely clear. The court may have
meant that an attorney may never invoke his client's privilege. Or, considering the
quoted proposition, the court may have meant to hold only that an attorney may
not invoke the privilege when his client is not a party (in Bouschor the client was
not a party). In either case the Bouschor holding would be contrary to Judson
since the Judson court allowed the attorney to invoke his client's privilege without
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Judson opinion, on the other hand, was that a description of the
privilege as "personal" suggests only that it is limited to "natural
individuals."' 3
It can be argued that Judson underemphasizes the importance of
the use of the term "personal" in limiting the bounds of the
privilege. The Supreme Court stated in Hale v. Henkel that even
an agent is prohibited from withholding information by invoking
the privilege in behalf of his principal. 14 It seems, therefore, that
"personal," as utilized by the Court in Hale, imports more than
mere limitation of the availability of the privilege to a "natural
individual." On the other hand, it is arguable that the Bouschor
court reaches the opposite extreme. Although the decision is
primarily based on the Hale description of the privilege as "per-
sonal," Bouschor appears to extend the rationale of Hale beyond
its intended limits. In connection with the statement that an agent
may not invoke his principal's privilege, the Hale opinion noted
that some courts have refused to allow an attorney to invoke the
privilege for his client.'5 The language the Court used in this
any mention of a requirement that the client be a party. The policy considerations
for allowing the attorney to invoke his client's privilege would seem to apply
whether or not the client was a party so long as he was actually invoking the
privilege in behalf of his client.
Although the reasons stated by the Bouschor court to be the basis of its decision
reveal a conflict with the thinking of the Judson court, the Judson court distinguished
the Bouschor case on other grounds considered infra.
13The Supreme Court was dealing with cases involving corporations and un-
incorporated associations when it developed the doctrine that the privilege is "per-
sonal." See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The Judson court reasoned
that in those cases the Supreme Court was referring only to such entities when it
qualified the privilege as "personal." 322 F.2d at 463-64.
1L 201 U.S. at 69-70. At least one federal court has ignored this statement. That
court, in holding that an attorney's invocation of his client's privilege was ineffective
because the client had waived it, stated that an attorn'ey may invoke his client's
privilege. Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1957). In connection with
this statement the Brody court said that "there appears to be some confusion con-
cerning the power of a duly authorized attorney to claim the privilege against
self-incrimination on behalf of his client in view of statements in two cases in other
circuits that, because the privilege is a personal one, it cannot be asserted by a third
party, not even by an attorney." The court here cited Ziegler v. United States, 174
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949) and United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa.
1947). The court further stated that these two cases are distinguishable because
they hold that a witness cannot successfully invoke the privilege in behalf of
another person or a corporation. "This is quite different from a holding that a
properly authorized agent of an individual including his attorney, is powerless to
assert the privilege for his principal in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme
Court has never so held, nor have we." 243 F.2d at 387 n.5. (Emphasis added.)
15 "Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privilege is a personal one that it has been
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context appears to isolate the attorney-client relationship from the
Court's conception of the general agency rule."6 Thus, the Supreme
Court apparently did not intend its description of the privilege as
"personal" to preclude an attorney from claiming it for his client.17
In United States v. Boccuto,'s the District Court for New Jersey
held, in a fact situation almost idential to that in Bouschor, that an
attorney has no standing to invoke his client's privilege. In both
Boccuto'9 and Bouschor2o the court found that the documents in
controversy belonged to a third person, not the client. Hence, as
ownership or personal possession of the documents to be withheld
is prerequisite to assertion of the privilege,2' the client himself
could not have invoked the privilege in either Boccuto or Bouschor.
In such a situation the Judson court would also deny the attorney's
claim of the privilege to avoid production since it ruled that the
attorney can invoke the privilege only when his client can.22  The
Judson court distinguished Boccuto and Bouschor on this "title"
basis. 23 According to the Judson decision, those two cases could
have been decided solely on the fact that the client did not own the
documents, without ever reaching the question of an attorney's
held in some cases that counsel will not be allowed to make the objection." 201
U.S. at 70.
"8 The Court did not reach the question of an attorney's standing to invoke the
privilege. The only effect of the Court's statement is to isolate such a case as
special, reserving its opinion on whether or not the attorney can invoke his client's
privilege.
1, A court could easily avoid the semantic difficulty presented by the description
of the privilege as "personal." There is strong authority for the general proposition
that the attorney-client relation "is purely a personal one," a very special principal-
agent relation. See 5 Am. Jun. Attorneys at Law § 45, at 285-86 (1936), and cases
cited therein. In this light it would seem that a court could easily construe the term
"personal" to sustain the attorney's invocation of the right for his client. This
solution is not a contradiction of the Court's language in Hale; rather it is an
alternative to rejecting that language as one court has done. See note 14 supra.
18 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
10 175 F. Supp. at 890.
20In Bouschor the attorney did not sustain his burden of proving that the
documents in question were the property of the client. This finding was made in
connection with the court's consideration of whether the attorney-client privilege
was available to the client to avoid disclosure of the papers. 316 F.2d at 456. It
would seem that this finding would also apply to his claim based upon the
privilege against self-incrimination.
"1United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). See generally 98 C.J.S.
Witnesses § 448 (1957) and cases cited therein.
22 See note 5 supra.
"3 Apparently, the only other case which purports to rule directly on the question
of an attorney's standing to invoke the privilege is In re Brumbaugh, 9 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 1748 (S.D. Cal. 1962). This case is also distinguishable in that the papers
in question were the attorney's own cancelled checks and bank statements.
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standing to invoke his client's privilege.2 4 Therefore, the Boccuto
and Bouschor cases do not represent strong authority against the
Judson position.
Since the "personal" concept is subject to varying interpretations
and since reasonable arguments can be advanced for each of these
positions, policy considerations should play a decisive role in de-
termining whether an attorney may invoke his client's privilege.2 r
With this view in mind, it is readily apparent that the Judson court
reached the better result. It is obvious that an attorney cannot
prepare his case adequately unless he is given all the information at
his client's disposal. The law encourages full cooperation between
client and attorney. So strong is this policy that the attorney-client
privilege was developed for the very purpose of insuring that a
client may feel free to disclose all aspects of his case to his attorney.2 0
The Judson rule is in accord with this policy because it encourages
full cooperation on the part of a client by allowing him to give his
papers to an attorney without fear that the prosecution will be able
to force the attorney to produce them.The Judson decision complies with the Supreme Court's policy
of liberally construing the fifth amendment 27 "to prevent the use
of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the
evidence necessary to convict him .... "28 There is no question that
the client himself can successfully invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination if he owns the papers and retains possession of them.20
21 Whether the court in Boccuto based its decision on the question of title or on
the statement that an attorney cannot invoke his client's privilege is unclear. The
court said: "The Court, therefore, concludes that the attorney does not, under these
circumstances, have the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in
behalf of his client, and that the work papers are the property of the accountant and
must be produced in accordance with the summons." 175 F. Supp. at 890.
25 Although reasonable arguments based on the word "personal" can be advanced
against the Judson position, as has been pointed out there is no strong case authority
against the Judson view. The courts which have expressed the view that an attorney
may not invoke the client's privilege have done so either in distinguishable cases
or in dictum.
-' See Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 594, 406-07 (1897); Blackburn v. Crawfords,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175, 192-93 (1865); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863
(8th Cir. 1956); Clark v. Turner, 183 F.2d 141, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
27 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Arndstein v. McCarthy,
254 U.S. 71, 72 (1920); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
28 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
29 See United States v. White, supra note 28; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). Of course, this statement is not meant to include those situations where
invocation of the privilege is precluded by the "required records" exception discussed
in note 5, supra.
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Since the attorney-client relationship is so close, forcing the attorney
to produce the papers is so much like forcing his client to do so
that any distinction is logically untenable. The effect of the
privilege is to require prosecutors to obtain independent evidence
of the accused's wrong-doing ° and a client's papers are not inde-
pendent while they are in his possession. It is difficult to determine
how they become independent when he leaves them with his at-
torney.31 As the Judson opinion suggests, the refusal to allow an
attorney to invoke his client's privilege requires the conclusion that.
a client "walked into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded
with the [Fifth] Amendment's protection, and walked out with
something less." 32
No disadvantage accrues to the prosecution through adoption of
the Judson rule. The papers will not be withheld unless the client
so desires. If the attorney asserts the privilege without consulting
his client, and it is later found that the client wishes to waive his
privilege, then the client's wishes, as in the operation of the attorney-
client privilege,33 should prevail. Moreover, there is no practical
reason for denying an attorney's standing to invoke his client's
privilege. The attorney has such broad authority to act for his
client that it would be little, if any, extension of his authority to
allow him to invoke his client's privilege in the absence of the
client.3 4 The attorney normally represents his client at the nu-
merous meetings which attend a tax fraud investigation.35 Pre-
3o United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
"I When the client hands over his papers to his attorney, he retains ownership of
them. The papers are subject to the control of the client even though the attorney
has temporary custody of them. Therefore, the evidence contained in the papers
could not be said to be gained from a source independent of the client. Although
this reasoning would appear to apply to any agency relationship, it would seem
especially applicable in a consideration of the attorney-client relationship. The
attorney has "powers entirely different from, and superior to, those of an ordinary
agent." 5 AM. JUR. Attorneys at Law § 6 (1936), and see authorities cited therein.
"322 F.2d at 466.
"[The attorney-client] privilege is that of the client alone, and no rule
prohibits the latter from divulging his own secrets; and if the client has voluntarily
waived the privilege, it canniot be insisted upon to close the mouth of the attorney."
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
31 "It is well settled that short of a compromise of a client's claim or a con-
fession of judgment the authority of counsel in a case extends generally to all the
customary incidents of litigation and embraces all agreements, stipulations, and
admissions appertaining to its conduct through the courts." Christy v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 233 Fed. 255, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1916). See Rogers v. The Marshal,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644, 651 (1863).
" One court has stated that requiring the client to attend these meetings would
place an unreasonable burden on the client. Application of House, 144 F. Supp.
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sumably, if the client were present and the papers were demanded
of the attorney, the client could invoke his privilege to avoid dis-
closure, even though the papers were in the temporary possession
of the attorney.36 Thus, a rule requiring the client to be present
to invoke his privilege in person operates only as a formality. As
such it lacks plausible justification when considered in relation to
the fact that an attorney advises his client regarding when, and
with respect to what, the client should invoke his privilege. The
client does not ordinarily make this decision without the advice of
counsel, and it seems doubtful that he would ignore this advice in
view of the fact that the attorney-client relationship begins be-
cause the client recognizes a need for legal advice. Therefore, even
when the client himself invokes his privilege, his attorney normally
has made the decision that it should be invoked.
The advantages of allowing an attorney to invoke his client's
privilege demand that the formal requirement of personal assertion
of the privilege be ignored. The rule in Judson comports with
the basic legal policy of promoting the ready availability of in-
formation to an attorney. In addition, it is consistent with the
notion that the client enters his attorney's office for aid in pro-
tecting his rights, not to lose some of the protection he already has.
Finally, it avoids requiring the client to give up valuable time in
order to be available to observe a mere formality.
95, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1956). This statement was cited with approval by the court in
Judson. 322 F.2d at 466. The refusal to allow an attorney to invoke his client's
privilege results in requiring the client to attend these meetings, or, take the chance
of losing the protection which the privilege should afford him.
"o If this were not true, consideration of the client's convenience would be of no
import because the client would not be able to invoke the privilege even if he were
present. However, the cases do not indicate that this conclusion is ill-founded.
There is a requirement that the person invoking the privilege be in possession of
the documents. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). However, one
court, at least, seems disposed to treat possession of the attorney as that of the client.
See Application of House, supra note 35.
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